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Costly Signals: Voter Responses 
to Parliamentary Dissent in Austria, 
Britain, and Germany
When Members of Parliament (MPs) disagree publicly with their party, 
this provides a signal to voters regarding both their political views and their 
character valence. We argue that the strength of this signal to voters depends on 
the personal career costs an MP incurs by dissenting. the greater the perceived 
costs of dissent to the MP, the more positively voters should react to dissent. in 
line with this theory, we use a series of conjoint analysis experiments in Britain, 
germany, and austria to show that: (1) dissent has a more positive effect on voter 
evaluations in systems where the costs of dissent are higher, and (2) more costly 
types of dissent have a greater impact on voter evaluations. these findings have 
important implications for understanding how voter evaluations of MPs depend 
on beliefs about parliamentary systems and how parliamentary institutions con-
dition the link between voters and MPs.
Introduction
What do voters in parliamentary democracies think of legis-
lative representatives who dissent from the party line? theories of 
parliamentary behavior often posit assumptions about the electoral 
reward (or personal vote) that legislators may or may not receive 
for dissent, by which we mean any action by which a representative 
signals disagreement with the party leadership (Benedetto and Hix 
2007; Carey 2007; Kam 2009; sieberer 2006; slapin et al. 2018). 
Motivated in part by the desire to unpack and test assumptions 
about electoral rewards, a growing number of researchers have 
studied whether voters reward parliamentary dissent and whether 
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they view it as a signal of policy position (e.g., Canes-Wrone, 
Brady, and Cogan 2002; Kam 2009; Kirkland and slapin 2018; 
Pattie, Fieldhouse, and Johnston 1994) or of valence (Campbell et 
al. 2019; Carson et al. 2010).1  However, whereas theories of legis-
lator dissent have increasingly emphasized the role of electoral and 
legislative institutions in shaping the incentives of parliamentar-
ians (e.g., Benedetto and Hix 2007; Carey and shugart 1995; Kam 
2009; slapin et al. 2018), there has been little corresponding re-
search examining whether and how voter reactions to dissent vary 
in different settings and contexts (though see doherty 2013).2  in 
this article, we redress this imbalance by developing and testing a 
theory of how voter reactions to dissent vary across and within po-
litical systems as a function of the context and type of that dissent.
dissent allows MPs to stand up for what they believe in and 
to signal to voters how their policy stances differ from those of the 
party (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Pattie, Fieldhouse, 
and Johnston 1994; Proksch and slapin 2015; slapin et al. 2018; 
vivyan and Wagner 2012). if  the policy position signalled by dis-
sent matters, then voters who are ideologically opposed to the 
party line will respond positively to defection by MPs in the same 
ideological direction (ansolabehere and Jones 2010; Canes-Wrone, 
Brady, and Cogan 2002). However, dissent may also be interpreted 
as a costly signal of character valence (and not just position) by 
voters (Campbell et al. 2019): voters may believe that MPs who dis-
sent possess desirable character traits such as resolve and trustwor-
thiness because they are willing to incur the personal career costs 
of dissent. Parliamentary voting is not unique in this regard: other 
types of costly legislative action, such as policy obstruction (Patty 
2016) or ideologically suboptimal committee assignments (Patty et 
al. 2019), might also be treated as signals of valence by voters. so 
dissent may be interpreted in terms of both position and valence; 
in this article, we focus on the latter type of voter response.
Based on the idea that dissent is in part a costly signal of va-
lence, we argue that voter reactions to dissent should vary across 
and within political systems as a function of the cost of dissent. 
We start from the observation that such costs are not constant. For 
example, they vary by type of dissent: MPs may be punished more 
for voting against their party in the legislature than for speaking 
out in the media (Proksch and slapin 2015). they also vary by 
institutional setting: dissent may be punished more in contexts 
where parliamentary parties have more carrots and sticks at their 
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disposal (Kam 2009; Proksch and slapin 2015; but see Kauder, 
Potrafke, and riem 2017).
We also argue that voters are aware, at least to some extent, of 
the potential risks run by an MP who defects from the party line. 
in other words, the institutional differences in the costs of dissent 
affect voter perceptions of how costly dissent is. Moreover, voters 
are also aware that different types of dissent exist, and that these 
carry different costs for MPs. voter evaluations of an MP will in 
turn be more affected by dissent when that dissent is seen as more 
costly. Hence, we expect voters to discount actions that may not 
reveal much about MPs’ character and beliefs.
We develop two key observable implications arising from this 
argument. First, the positive impact of dissent on voter evalua-
tions of an MP should be greater in institutional settings where 
dissent is more costly, at least to the extent that voters are aware 
of these costs. second, within a political system, different types of 
dissent—for example, dissent in the media versus dissenting votes 
in parliamentary votes—should have different effects on voter 
evaluations of an MP, with a greater effect for those types of dis-
sent seen as incurring greater career costs.
We test our expectations by running conjoint analysis ex-
periments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and yamamoto 2014) where 
respondents are asked to rate pairs of hypothetical Members of 
Parliament (MPs) characterized by several randomly varying at-
tributes, including their dissent behavior. importantly, we also 
include information on the policy preferences of the MP as well 
as party affiliation, characteristics that might otherwise be asso-
ciated with (or “aliased” by) dissent (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and 
yamamoto 2014).
We ran these experiments on samples of voters in three coun-
tries: austria, Britain, and germany. the different legislative and 
electoral institutions in these countries cause variation in the ob-
jective costs of dissent, which should in turn affect the perceived 
costs of dissent and thus the value of dissent as a valence signal for 
voters. austria, Britain, and germany are suitable cases to study 
because the costs of dissent vary across the three countries due to 
the nature of the electoral systems and the forms of parliamen-
tary and party organization. We argue that the costs of dissent 
are highest in austria and lowest in Britain, and this should affect 
voter perceptions of and reactions to such behavior. Our conjoint 
analyses also include varying types of dissent and additional ques-
tions concerning the perceived costs of dissent to MPs and their 
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parties, allowing us to perform within-country tests of reactions 
to different types of dissent that vary in their cost to the legislator.
Our findings largely confirm our expectations. the effect of 
dissent on voter evaluations of an MP is greater on average in the 
german and austrian samples. this finding holds even account-
ing for alternative explanations for these country differences, such 
as average levels of political interest, ideological extremism, or 
populist attitudes. Next, we find that, within each country sample, 
voters place more weight on dissent expressed by voting against 
the party line than on dissent expressed in the media, in parlia-
ment, or behind closed doors. in addition, we find that dissent by 
government MPs is given more weight than dissent by opposition 
MPs, perhaps because such disagreement is also more costly.
Our findings extend the relevance of the valence signalling 
theory of legislative behavior as costly signals (Campbell et al. 
2019; Patty 2016; Patty et al. 2019). voters weight signals differ-
ently depending on how well they provide information on incum-
bent valence, and this is related to the cost of sending these signals. 
the core contribution of this article is therefore that it provides the 
first individual-level and cross-national evidence of how the costli-
ness of signals matters for voter evaluations of legislative behavior. 
in the conclusion, we reflect further on the substantive implica-
tions of our findings.
Voters Infer Valence Characteristics from Dissent
recent research argues that dissent provides information to 
voters about an MP’s valence characteristics, which are attributes 
such as steadfastness or honesty that are valued by most individu-
als (Campbell et al. 2019; Mondak 1995; stone and simas 2010). 
Most voters want to elect candidates who are honest and trustwor-
thy, but these qualities are not directly observable. When voters 
observe MPs publicly disagreeing with their party and incurring 
the attendant career costs, they may infer that these MPs are less 
concerned about their personal political ambitions and thus com-
paratively principled and trustworthy.
given that dissent thus partly signals “valence”-type attrib-
utes that are valued by most individuals, we would expect at least 
part of the effect of MP dissent upon voter evaluations to be un-
conditionally positive. in fact, when voters hear that a parliamen-
tarian has spoken out against his or her party, they may take from 
this mainly that the MP appears to be principled and remember 
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less about the policy-specific reasons that drove the MP to speak 
out. this may be because discerning policy-based signals requires 
more interest and attention, while disagreement with the party line 
is more easily registered. Campbell et al. (2019) indeed show that 
voters see dissent as a signal of personal qualities, even more than 
as a signal of policy positions. a similar argument is proposed by 
Carson et al. (2010), who show that voters in the united states 
value independence from the party per se rather than conditional 
on the specific policy positions signalled by independence.3 
a valence signalling account of dissent is consistent with the 
pronouncements that politicians make.4  When, for example, the 
British Conservative Party MP Philip davies made the following 
claim about his political motivations in his first parliamentary 
speech, it was his subsequent record of frequent votes against the 
party line—and in particular the career costs he incurred through 
such dissent—that made the claim credible:
i have no desire to rise through the ranks … i wish to remain on the back 
benches and to speak up for the things that matter to me and my constit-
uents. i want people to know that when i say something, i say it because i 
mean it, not because someone has told me to say it.5 
similarly, when Labour Party Chief Whip Nick Brown MP was 
asked why current party leader Jeremy Corbyn—a particularly fre-
quent dissenter when Brown held the Chief Whip role under previ-
ous Labour leaders—should be well-suited to running the party, 
he explicitly associated rebellion with being honest and principled:
i never once got him to change his mind when he was going to against the 
Labour government. … strength of character and personal decency, you’re 
asking me what his strengths are, those are his strengths.
However, note that we do not assume that voters only infer 
valence when this is the intended signal of MPs. Parliamentarians 
dissent for a variety of reasons, including personal conviction, 
policy motivations, and to build up a personal vote through policy 
positioning or valence signalling (Proksch and slapin 2015; slapin 
et al. 2018). Below, we assume that voters often interpret dissent as 
a valence signal, regardless of whether the MP’s decision is in fact 
driven by policy, career, or electoral goals. One reason they should 
do so is because dissent can incur important costs to MPs.
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The Role of Dissent Costs in Determining Voter Responses
voters reward dissent because they believe such behavior 
contains information about important qualities of the MP. the 
potential costs the MP incurs are crucial because it is the willing-
ness to incur costs that gives value to the signal and makes it a 
useful heuristic for voters. this also means that the extent to which 
dissent positively affects voters’ beliefs about the quality of an MP 
should depend on how much it costs the MP to dissent. the basic 
inference we envisage voters making is as follows: as the career 
costs that an MP incurs for dissent increase, an MP must care 
more about expressing his or her dissenting opinion—or less about 
diminished career prospects—in order to be willing to engage in 
dissent and pay these costs.
One can think about this in terms of the logic of a signalling 
game (e.g., spence 1973). in the game, voter pay-offs are based on 
the quality of the representative they choose in the next election, 
with quality defined as a continuous parameter that varies accord-
ing to some probability distribution across MPs. the challenge for 
voters is that they cannot directly observe the quality of their in-
cumbent MP. they only observe whether or not the MP dissents 
from his or her party. Hence, the signal in this case is whether an 
MP dissents from the party line. this makes an MP the signal 
“sender” and the voter the signal “receiver.”
an important additional aspect of the game is that all MPs 
pay some baseline cost k for dissent. However, there is an addi-
tional cost increment that varies according to the quality of the 
MP: lower-quality MPs pay a larger cost increment than higher-
quality MPs. this could be because lower-quality MPs are more 
concerned about progressing in their parliamentary career or 
because they experience lower expressive benefits from speaking 
their mind.6 
according to the valence signalling account of legislative dis-
sent, there is a semiseparating equilibrium where (1) only those 
MPs whose quality is above a certain threshold q*(k) will dissent 
and (2) voters grant such MPs an electoral bonus, provided the 
baseline cost of dissent k is high enough and MPs value re-election 
sufficiently. the logic is that MPs below the quality threshold are 
deterred from “mimicking” the higher-quality MPs by dissenting 
because the costs for them outweigh the electoral benefits. it is cru-
cial that in this equilibrium voters will (correctly) believe that MPs 
who dissent despite the costs of doing so have a higher average 
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quality (in terms of honesty and/or strength of principles) than 
those who do not. in other words, dissent helps voters distinguish 
between MPs based on quality.
What happens when the baseline cost of dissent (relative to 
the benefits of re-election) across MPs increases? if  costs increase 
from some value k1 to a higher-value k2, this will lead to an increase 
in the quality threshold at which MPs dissent. Of those MPs who 
would previously have dissented, some of the lower-quality ones 
now find it too costly to do so.7  thus, fewer MPs engage in dis-
sent when this becomes more costly. More importantly, this means 
that voters can also (correctly) infer that the average quality of 
those MPs who do dissent is now higher. Furthermore, provided 
the PdF of the distribution of MP quality is strictly declining be-
tween q*(k1) and q*(k2), voters will infer that the difference in 
the average quality of MPs who do and do not dissent has also 
increased.8  Hence, if  voters understand that MPs’ willingness to 
bear the costs of dissent contains information about their charac-
ter, then the extent of these costs should matter to voters, too.
How the Costs of Dissent Vary
in this section, we consider how the cost of dissent k var-
ies, as this should matter for how voters evaluate MP behavior. 
Here, we consider two determinants of the cost of legislator dis-
sent: the country-level institutional setting and the type of dissent. 
variation in these determinants of the costs of dissent should in-
fluence the effect of dissent on voter evaluations of an MP.
First, the cost of dissent varies by institutional setting. the 
fundamental mechanism driving this variation is whether there 
are incentives for parties to allow some amount of personal vote 
seeking by MPs (Proksch and slapin 2015). Hence, parliamentary 
systems differ in the electoral incentives for MPs to voice disagree-
ment, as well as in whether parties tend to impose costs on such 
dissenting MPs (Kam 2009). Parties can sometimes benefit from 
the individual appeal that MPs can generate by taking distinct 
positions (Proksch and slapin 2015). this is largely the case in 
electoral systems where MPs can build up a personal vote (Carey 
and shugart 1995). Parties work harder to protect the integrity of 
their label or brand in closed-list Pr systems than in majoritarian 
single-member-district systems (Proksch and slapin 2015, 25). We 
can therefore distinguish systems where parties may benefit from 
the independent appeal of MPs—e.g., single-member or open-list 
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proportional districts—from parliamentary systems with single-
tier, closed-list proportional representation, where MPs’ unique 
appeal has few benefits as voters choose between parties not can-
didates. the costs of dissent are higher when parties have no in-
centive to allow for personal vote seeking. MPs may nevertheless 
choose dissent due to personal conviction, policy motivations, or 
because they think they may not be punished.
if  parties do want to induce their MPs to remain loyal by im-
posing painful costs on them, the extent to which parties can do so 
also depends on institutional characteristics such as the electoral 
system, parliamentary institutions, and candidate-selection mech-
anisms (Carey and shugart 1995; Kam 2009). these institutions 
determine party leaders’ repertoire of sanctions and rewards that 
can be used to induce MP loyalty. specifically, parliamentary insti-
tutions determine the extent to which parties can promise ministe-
rial appointment and provide MPs with office benefits (Benedetto 
and Hix 2007; Cox 1987; Kam 2009). as Benedetto and Hix (2007, 
760) note, these carrots and sticks will also influence the decision 
calculus of MPs who are mainly interested in policy, since jobs as 
minister, posts as committee chairpersons, or indeed a seat in par-
liament will allow such MPs to realize policy goals (Kam 2009).
in general, the relevant institutional patterns are therefore 
as follows. at one extreme, with high costs of  dissent to MPs, 
lie closed-list proportional systems, especially if  they also have 
weak committees and leader-controlled candidate selection. at 
the other extreme, with low costs to MPs, are single-member dis-
tricts, particularly if  coupled with strong committees and con-
stituency-controlled candidate selection.9  as a result, the costs 
of  dissent in some parliamentary systems are generally higher 
than in other systems.10  Overall, these institutional differences 
generate variations in the “baseline” system-level costs of  dissent, 
which in turn determine the quality of  the valence signal of  dis-
sent for voters in each system.
Of course, these differences need to be noted by voters, even 
if  imperfectly and with significant interpersonal variation. this 
would mean that the overall perceived costs of dissent should be 
higher in some systems than in others, in line with the actual costs 
of dissent in these systems. We test this empirically in our surveys 
in austria, Britain, and germany. as a result, we expect that  in 
systems that impose higher costs on dissenting MPs, voters will 
recognize that there is a higher-quality threshold for dissent and 
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will therefore update their beliefs about MP quality more drasti-
cally when dissent is observed.
thus, our first hypothesis is:
H1: the more costly dissent is to MPs in a political system, the 
greater the positive effect of dissent on voter evaluations of an 
MP.
the second source of variation in the costs of dissent relates 
to different types of dissent within each country. as Proksch and 
slapin (2015) point out, while most existing research focuses on 
voting against the party line as the primary way of measuring leg-
islator independence, MPs might use different means to express 
their dissatisfaction with the party line. drawing on Proksch and 
slapin (2015, 24–28), we can think of four ways that MPs can ex-
press dissent: (1) verbally at internal party meetings, (2) verbally in 
the media, (3) verbally in parliamentary debates (which voters usu-
ally observe only indirectly via media coverage), and (4) by voting 
against the party in the parliament.11 
Of these four types of dissent, we assume that expressed ver-
bally at internal party meetings (type 1) is the least costly for an 
MP. For example, Crowe (1983) surveys members of party leader-
ship in the uK House of Commons about different types of dis-
sent and finds that they tend not to consider internal dissent a 
serious breach of discipline. Cowley’s (2002) interviews with par-
liamentarians also suggest that party leaders see the facilitation 
of private backbench dissent (and potentially policy concessions 
in response to such dissent) as a useful party-management tactic. 
We also assume that dissent expressed via voting against the party 
in parliament (type 4) is the most costly form of dissent. this is 
consistent with Proksch and slapin’s (2015) argument and with 
Crowe’s (1983) finding that members of party leadership in the 
united Kingdom consider this the most serious breach of disci-
pline. the costs entailed by the remaining two types of dissent—
verbal dissent in the media (type 2) and in parliamentary debates 
(type 3)—are assumed to lie in between these two extremes, again 
consistent with the views expressed by party leaders in Crowe 
(1983) and with Proksch and slapin (2015). However, while Crewe 
finds that media dissent is considered by party leaders to be a more 
serious breach of discipline than dissent in parliamentary debates, 
Proksch and slapin argue that dissent in debates is likely to be more 
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costly because MPs can more easily refute or backtrack on media 
statements than those made on the parliamentary record (2015, 
27). Which of these final two types of dissent incurs a higher cost 
for an MP is therefore subject to disagreement.
to the extent that voters perceive the relative costs of these 
different types of dissent, and if  they treat more costly forms of 
dissent as a stronger signal, we can form testable expectations. 
First, because both verbal and vote dissent entail positive cost to 
the MP—and therefore engaging in both types of dissent is more 
costly overall than engaging in just verbal dissent—one would 
expect MPs who engage in both types of dissent to be evaluated 
more positively than MPs who only engage in verbal dissent:12 
H2a: the combined impact of verbal and vote dissent on voter 
evaluations of an MP is greater than that of verbal dissent alone.
second, given the relative costs of different verbal types of 
dissent above, we expect that:
H2b: verbal dissent in parliamentary debates and verbal dissent 
in the media both have a greater impact on voter evaluations of 
an MP than internal dissent.
Experimental Design
We use a conjoint analysis survey experiment to examine voter 
reactions to MP dissent (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and yamamoto 
2014). in such experiments, participants are presented with two 
or more choices that vary randomly on a set of attributes and are 
asked to rate or choose between these options. Here, we ask re-
spondents to rate pairs of hypothetical Members of Parliament 
whose dissent behavior varies randomly.
We use an experimental design for two reasons. First, it allows 
us to ensure that all respondents are provided with the same facts 
about MP behavior, so there will be no nonexperimental heteroge-
neity in information. For instance, it may be that dissent generates 
profile effects, so that rebellious MPs are better known than other 
MPs and receive an electoral benefit from this (Kam 2009). such 
heterogeneity could easily hinder inferences in observational data. 
second, we can ensure that dissent is exogenous, so that it is not 
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related to other attributes of the MP or of the political system. in 
a real-world setting, MP dissent behavior may be correlated with 
many other aspects (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Kam 2009), again 
preventing accurate inferences from the data.
We conducted three population-based conjoint analysis sur-
vey experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and yamamoto 2014), 
one each in germany, austria, and Britain.13  We use this approach 
for two reasons. First, it allows us to benchmark the effects of dis-
sent in the context of other MP attributes (such as party affiliation 
or gender). second, we include three attributes that are particu-
larly important because they describe characteristics that may be 
associated with (or “aliased by”) dissent in the minds of voters: 
party affiliation, political ideology, and constituency focus. in a 
traditional split-sample survey experiment where the above dissent 
treatment is the only MP attribute that is randomized, it would be 
difficult to identify whether respondents react to dissent as a signal 
of quality or whether they make inferences about other character-
istics of MPs based on their dissent (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and 
yamamoto 2014). therefore, in the conjoint analysis vignettes, we 
also include information regarding these other MP attributes.
the surveys were run with survey sampling international in 
March 2017. each survey had around 2,000 respondents. these 
were chosen from the online access panels run by ssi or its inter-
national partners. Quotas were implemented so that respondents 
would be representative of the population in terms of age, gender, 
and region. More details on the representativeness of the samples 
can be found in appendix F in the online supporting information. 
in each country, we weight the sample based on the joint distribu-
tions of age, gender, and region.14 
Before we turn to describing our experiment in detail, we dis-
cuss our three country cases—Britain, germany, and austria—
and how they vary in terms of system-level costs of dissent.
Costs of Dissent in Austria, Britain, and Germany
Here, we briefly outline the electoral and parliamentary sys-
tems of Britain, germany, and austria and how they may affect 
the costs of dissent for MPs. recent research shows that dissent 
occurs more frequently in Britain than in germany and austria 
(Little and Farrell 2017). One reason for this may be differences 
in the costs of dissent in each system. For each country, we first 
focus on the extent to which parties are likely to allow MPs to seek 
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a personal vote and impose costs on MPs who demonstrate inde-
pendence (Kam 2009; Proksch and slapin 2015).
We start where the costs of dissent are lowest: Britain. the 
House of Commons is elected using single-member districts, 
which allows for relatively strong personal vote seeking (Carey and 
shugart 1995; Proksch and slapin 2015). although voting behav-
ior in Britain is party centered, some citizens might consider cast-
ing a personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987)—and, as 
various scholars argue, they have increasingly been doing so over 
the last decades (eggers 2014; vivyan, Wagner, and tarlov 2012). 
this means that both parties and MPs have an incentive to create 
a level of name recognition and valence reputation in each con-
stituency (Proksch and slapin 2015). some party mavericks may 
be particularly hard to punish by parties if  they have significant 
popularity (tavits 2009). Hence, the costs of dissent to MPs are 
rather moderate in Britain because parties have a modest incentive 
to allow MPs to seek a personal vote.
the costs of dissent should be higher in germany than in 
Britain. the Bundestag is elected via a two-tier, mixed-member 
proportional electoral system. german voters cast two votes: 
a candidate ballot for a district candidate (“erststimme”) and a 
party-list ballot for a party (“Zweitstimme”). voters are allowed to 
split their vote. the overall share of party seats in the Bundestag 
is proportional to the overall vote share of each party on the 
party-list ballot (for more details, see saalfeld 2005). due to the 
combination of majoritarian and proportional elements, german 
MPs have a small incentive to build up a personal vote, which may 
even lead parties to reward dissent on occasion (Crisp et al. 2013). 
However, parties have little reason to foster personal vote seeking 
since the distribution of seats is determined by the party-list vote 
(Proksch and slapin 2015). Because parties have few incentives to 
allow MPs to seek a personal vote, the costs of dissent to MPs are 
potentially large in germany, though parties do not always make 
use of these powers (Kauder, Potrafke, and riem 2017).
Finally, the costs of dissent are likely to be highest in austria. 
austria employs a three-tier proportional electoral system that 
has a weak flexible list component (Müller 2005; shugart 2005). 
specifically, citizens have the possibility to affect the party-list 
ranking in each tier by casting a preferential vote within their 
party of choice. However, the number of votes needed to reorder 
the list is very large, so that very few candidates have ever been suc-
cessful in gaining enough votes to reorder the list. One example is 
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that of Josef Cap, a social democratic politician who criticized the 
party openly, was given a low ranking on the party list, and only 
made it into parliament via preference votes. such cases are very 
rare, and more often dissenters are summarily deselected or moved 
down the list and fail to win re-election. Hence, the incentives for 
personal vote seeking are therefore low, and dissent should there-
fore be relatively costly for an MP in austria.
Of course, the three countries also differ in other impor-
tant institutional arrangements relevant for the costs of dissent. 
One particularly relevant arrangement is candidate-selection pro-
cedures. in Britain, candidate selection, while dominated by the 
national party (Lundell 2004), is often partially determined at 
the constituency level (Hopkin 2001), making independence less 
costly to MPs in terms of re-election chances. Candidate selection 
in germany is rather centralized at the regional level, especially for 
the party list (Bille 2001, 138; Hazan and rahat 2010), although 
candidate selection for district seats is highly decentralized. in 
austria, candidate selection is relatively centralized at the regional 
level (Bille 2001; Hazan and rahat 2010; Lundell 2004), meaning 
re-election chances are almost entirely in the hands of regional 
party elite. Hence, candidate-selection procedures also point to a 
similar country ordering (united Kingdom-germany-austria) in 
terms of costs, but the pattern is less stark than in terms of per-
sonal vote seeking.
also relevant for the costs of dissent is the extent to which 
institutional arrangements within legislatures allow party leaders 
to control MPs’ parliamentary career advancement and therefore 
to condition this advancement on loyalty (sieberer 2006). Here 
the cross-national differences are less clear cut. On the one hand, 
the united Kingdom has more ministerial posts than germany 
or austria and a higher rate of parliamentarians are generally ap-
pointed to those posts (de Winter 1995). thus, the costs of dis-
sent to an MP in terms of foregone opportunities for ministerial 
promotion may be greater in the united Kingdom. On the other 
hand, the lower houses of the german and austrian parliaments 
have relatively powerful legislative committees (sieberer 2011) and 
appointment to these committees is largely in the hands of party 
leaders (damgaard 1995), whereas appointments to the most pow-
erful and prestigious parliamentary committees in the uK parlia-
ment (select committees, which focus on nonlegislative oversight) 
are made by secret ballot and therefore not controlled by party 
leaders (Fisher 2015).
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Overall, taking the lack of clear country-level differences in 
dissent costs due to parliamentary career incentives together with 
the clear country-level differences in the dissent costs implied by 
electoral-system incentives and candidate-selection rules, we as-
sume dissent costs to be on average lowest in the united Kingdom, 
higher in germany, and highest in austria.
Vignette Design: Politician Attributes
Figure 1 shows a screen-shot of our conjoint experiment. 
Below, we present in detail the attribute levels for each MP attrib-
ute, as well as the logic behind these design decisions.
to measure party loyalty, we tell respondents whether a poli-
tician tends to criticize and vote against his or her party. We do not 
Figure 1  
screen-shot of Conjoint design (in Britain)
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mention a specific policy area and focus instead on MPs’ general 
behavior, which can often lead to important public reputations as 
“rebellious” or “outspoken” MPs. However, we also include MP 
ideology in our vignette (see below), so respondents could at least 
infer the likely direction of dissent.15 
MPs could either “never” or “sometimes” criticize their 
party. among MPs who sometimes criticize the party, such dissent 
was either expressed at internal party meetings, in parliamentary 
debates, or in the media and was either “always” or “hardly ever” 
accompanied by a vote against the party line. We formulated vot-
ing as an additional form of dissent as Proksch and slapin (2015) 
argue that forms of dissent are cumulative, so that voting against 
the party almost by necessity includes public dissent in the media 
or in parliament. the possible attribute levels are presented in 
table 1. Note that for some analyses, we collapse the three types of 
verbal dissent (internal, in debates, and in the media). in addition, 
we do not allow for vote-only dissent since this is rarely a plausible 






None He/she never criticizes his/
her party.
N/a
internal Meetings He/she sometimes criticizes 
his/her party at internal 
party meetings, but hardly 
ever votes against his/her 
party.
He/she sometimes criticizes his/her 
party at internal party meetings, 
and then votes against his/her 
party.
debates He/she sometimes criticizes 
his/her party in parlia-
mentary debates, but 
hardly ever votes against 
his/her party.
He/she sometimes criticizes his/her 
party in parliamentary debates, 
and then votes against his/her 
party.
Media He/she sometimes criticizes 
his/her party in the media, 
but hardly ever votes 
against his/her party.
He/she sometimes criticizes his/
her party in the media, and then 
votes against his/her party.
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Other Attributes
the loyalty-dissent attribute is the key feature of our conjoint 
analysis experiment. However, we also vary other attributes, focus-
ing in particular on those that may be associated with dissent.
Party affiliation and political ideology. voters might associate 
certain dissent behavior with the party affiliation and political 
ideology of  politicians. For instance, they might think that 
dissenting MPs are part of  the government. We therefore 
randomized information about the MPs’ party. People might also 
believe that MPs dissenting from a social democratic party are 
to the left of  their party and that MPs dissenting from a center-
right party are to the right of  their party. We therefore also 
included explicit information about ideology, thereby accounting 
for this type of  association made by voters. By including ideology, 
we can also test whether the effects of  dissent are conditional on 
policy views.
in Britain, politicians were affiliated with the Labour or the 
Conservative Party; in germany with sPd or Cdu/Csu, and in 
austria with sPÖ, ÖvP, or FPÖ.16  We then also indicated whether 
the politician is from the moderate wing of a party or from the 
right wing (right-wing parties) or the left wing (left-wing parties). 
Hence, for the Conservatives and the Cdu, ÖvP, and FPÖ, MPs 
could either be right wing or moderate; for Labour, sPd, and sPÖ, 
the MPs could either be left wing or moderate. given these state-
ments of an MP’s intraparty ideological leaning, respondents are 
able to make inferences about the ideological content of dissent 
they observe: when MPs on the left (right) wing of a left (right) 
party dissent, this is likely to be dissent against moderate party 
positions; when moderate MPs dissent from either a left or right 
party, this is likely to be dissent against more extreme ideological 
party positions.
Work focus. since voters might think that dissenting MPs are 
more oriented towards constituency service, and voters value 
such service (vivyan and Wagner 2016), it is important 
to account for actual constituency service in the vignette. 
We therefore included information on whether a politician 
focuses predominantly on developing national policies or on 
addressing local problems.
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Other attributes help to flesh out the vignettes. these 
attributes are gender (male or female); regional background;17  
parents’ occupation;18  and prior work experience.19 
in each country, we stated at the beginning of the experiment 
that all MPs were elected at the last election. in germany, we also 
informed respondents that MPs were elected via the constituency 
vote; in austria, we told respondents that MPs were elected in the 
lowest electoral tier.
We asked respondents to rate two hypothetical politicians 
on a 1–7 feeling scale, indicating their general preference towards 
each politician.20  respondents had to perform five comparisons 
in total. We opted for a paired rating task, following the valida-
tion analysis of Hainmueller, Hangartner, and yamamoto (2015), 
which shows that ratings of vignette pairs provide more valid as-
sessments than choices and single-vignette ratings.21  to avoid pri-
macy or recency effects, we randomized the order of attributes to 
some extent: we varied the order in which the three sets of attrib-
utes (party affiliation and ideology; parents’ and own occupation; 
and regional background, work focus and party loyalty) appeared. 
these three blocks were randomized across respondents.
Perceptions of the Cost of Dissent
Our expectations are built on the assumption that voters to 
some extent understand differences in the cost of dissent to MPs. 
We tested this empirically in our surveys.
One way of thinking about the perceived costs of dissent is 
asking how often voters think that MPs dissent from their party, 
under the assumption that the perceived costs are lower if  this dis-
sent is frequent. We therefore asked: “How often do you think that 
MPs in great Britain disagree with their party publicly (e.g., in the 
media or during a parliamentary debate)?” and “How often do 
you think that MPs vote against their party in parliament?”22  the 
response scale was “often,” “sometimes,” “rarely,” or “never.”23  
Based on these questions, Figure 2 presents the perceptions of 
costs of dissent in germany, austria, and Britain. the figure 
shows that germans and austrians believe that MPs vote against 
and disagree publicly with their party less often than British re-
spondents. the effects are about 0.2 (disagreement) and 0.4 (vot-
ing), measured on a 1–4 scale. the standard deviations for both 
variables are about 0.8, so these differences are substantial.
18 Markus Wagner, Nick vivyan, and Konstantin glinitzer
Figure 2  
Country-Level differences in the Perceived Frequency and Costs 
of dissent 
Note. this plot shows the differences in perceived frequency and costs of dissent in austria 
and germany compared to Britain. Coefficients are from OLs regressions with indicator 
variables for germany and austria. the points without horizontal bars denote Britain, the 
reference category. the statements measuring the perceived frequency were: “How often do 
you think that MPs in [the united Kingdom, austria, germany] disagree with their party 
publicly (e.g., in the media or during a parliamentary debate)?” and “How often do you 
think that MPs vote against their party in parliament?” the response scale was: “often,” 
“sometimes,” “rarely,” or “never,” recoded here to a 0–3 scale. Costs of dissent were asked 
with the following question: “MPs who openly criticize their party are punished by the 
party leadership (e.g., they are no longer nominated).” respondents could answer on a 
5-point Likert agree-disagree scale (recoded to a 0 to 4 scale). No “don’t know” option was 
provided for the three questions.
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We also measured voters’ perceptions of the costs of dissent 
in our surveys. We asked respondents how much they agreed with 
the following statement: “MPs who openly criticize their party are 
punished by the party leadership (e.g., they are no longer nomi-
nated).” respondents could answer on a 5-point Likert agree-
disagree scale.24  Based on this question, Figure 2 shows voters in 
germany and austria think that dissent is more costly than British 
respondents. On average, the responses of germans and austrians 
are 0.1 to 0.2 units higher than in Britain, a difference that is sta-
tistically significant. given that the standard deviation of this vari-
able is about 0.9, the cross-national differences are moderate.
Overall, we have clear evidence that voters do notice that 
the costs of rebellion are higher in germany and austria than in 
Britain. it is also consistent with expectations that the costs are 
perceived to be higher in austria than in germany, given that the 
single-member-district element of MMP systems provides parties 
with some incentive to allow for MP independence (Proksch and 
slapin 2015).
to our knowledge, this is the first survey that shows that 
there are differences in the perceived costs and frequency of dis-
sent across countries. these findings also provide an important 
foundation to our analysis below, which assumes that such differ-
ences in perceptions are present.
Cross-Country Variation in Reactions to Dissent
Now, we turn to the analysis of the conjoint analysis experi-
ment. these yield 10 observed MP ratings per respondent, one 
for each of two MPs in each of five choice tasks. We treat these 
observed MP ratings as our units of analysis and estimate ordi-
nary least square regressions where the dependent variable is the 
observed rating score (measured on a 1 to 7 scale), and the predic-
tor variables are a series of indicators for each level of each MP 
attribute in the experiment. the coefficient on each of these indi-
cators represents the estimated average marginal component effect 
(aMCe) of a particular level of an MP attribute on MP ratings, 
averaging over the levels of all remaining attributes (Hainmueller, 
Hopkins, and yamamoto 2014). standard errors are clustered 
by respondent. the initial results in Figure 3 collapse the three 
types of verbal dissent (in internal meetings, in debates, and in the 
media). Hence, we compare MPs who do not dissent to MPs who 
dissent verbally and vote against the party (top section) and MPs 
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who dissent verbally but hardly ever vote against the party (bot-
tom section).
in line with Hypothesis 1, Figure 3 shows that the effects of 
dissent are much higher in germany and austria than in Britain. 
the effect of verbal dissent without vote dissent is significant and 
on average adds between 0.2 and 0.3 points to a voter’s evalua-
tion of an MP in germany and austria, whereas the effect is close 
Figure 3  
Country-Level differences in reactions to dissent 
Note. this plot shows estimated aMCes of the randomly assigned MP dissent attribute on 
MP ratings for Britain (N = 1,988), germany (N = 1,992), and austria (N = 2,164). dissent 
behavior has three categories with “no dissent” as the reference category. MP ratings are 
measured on a 7-point scale (from 1 [very unhappy] to 7 [very happy]). estimates are based 
on an OLs regression with clustered standard errors. sociodemographic weights were 
applied. Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals. surveys were carried out by 
ssi in March 2017.
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to zero and nonsignificant in Britain. the effect of verbal dis-
sent coupled with vote dissent is significant and positive across 
all countries, but it is around 0.4 points higher in germany and 
austria than in Britain.
in terms of  magnitude, the effects of  dissent in the german 
and austrian samples are substantial. in fact, the effects of 
verbal plus voting dissent are among the largest of  any of  the 
MP attributes included in the experiment (see appendix a in 
the online supporting information). the strongest effect is for 
the party affiliation of  the MP, which we include in our regres-
sion as the sympathy of  the respondent for the party of  the MP. 
dissent is generally the second or third most relevant attribute 
for respondents. dissent thus always has a bigger impact than 
class roots, occupation, regional background, or gender. in the 
united Kingdom, only party affiliation and constituency work 
focus have a stronger effect than voting against the party. Hence, 
the effects of  dissent stand out from other attributes, particularly 
in germany and austria.
in sum, there is a clear difference between Britain on the 
one hand and germany and austria on the other, with dissent re-
warded much more in the latter two countries. However, we also 
suggested that the perceived costs of dissent are higher in austria 
than  in germany. yet we do not find that austrian respondents 
react more positively to dissent than german respondents. We do 
not have an explanation for this, but it may be that both countries 
have similar electoral systems and similar levels of party discipline, 
so that differences between the two countries are not as large as the 
perceptions in Figure 2 would suggest.
in appendix B in the online supporting information, we also 
examine whether the dissent attributes interact with party iden-
tification and voter ideology. For example, supporters of a party 
might respond more positively to dissent from outside their pre-
ferred party and from MPs close to their own ideological views 
(Campbell et al. 2019). in all three countries, we see that ingroup 
dissent has weaker effects than outgroup dissent (Figure B2). Note 
that this contrasts with the assumption in slapin et al. (2018) that 
dissent is mainly aimed at extreme own-party voters. at the same 
time, the relative effects of dissent across countries is the same, no 
matter whether respondents assess in- or outgroup MPs. appendix 
B also includes results that show that voter-level ideology does not 
explain away reactions to dissent (Figure B3).
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Alternative Explanations
Our analysis of cross-national differences in the perceived 
costs of dissent (see Figure 2) lends plausibility to the argument 
that these average country-level differences in voter reactions to 
MP dissent are driven by country-level differences in the costs of 
dissent. However, there are, of course, other differences between 
these countries that might drive our results. We therefore also test 
the robustness of our findings to alternative explanations.
First, it may be that voters in austria and germany differ 
in other ways from voters in Britain and that this drives differ-
ences in reactions to dissent. For instance, it may be that austrian 
and german voters are on average more populist, ideologically 
extreme, or politically interested than voters in Britain. such vot-
ers may react more positively to dissent: populist voters may en-
dorse the antiestablishment implications of dissent; ideologically 
extreme voters may endorse dissent, especially if  this matches their 
preferences (although see appendix B in the online supporting in-
formation); and politically interested voters may be better at un-
derstanding the political costs of dissent. Hence, if  countries differ 
in their average populism, extremism, or political interest, this may 
also explain cross-country differences in reactions to dissent.
in our surveys, there are indeed differences in average po-
litical interest, populism, and ideological extremism between the 
three countries. in particular, voters in germany and austria are 
on average more extreme, more populist, and more politically in-
terested than voters in Britain (see Figures C1 and C2 in the online 
supporting information). these differences could therefore con-
ceivably explain why these voters on average react more positively 
to dissent. However, further analyses that control for these factors 
(and their interaction with MP dissent) still show stable and sig-
nificant country-level differences in reactions to dissent. Overall, 
accounting for these alternative explanations therefore does not 
weaken our country-level finding (see Figure C3).
another possibility is that voters react to dissent differently 
conditional on the policy view it signals and that the strength of 
these effects varies cross-nationally. For example, it may be that 
voters in germany and austria care more about the policy con-
tent of dissent signals than British voters. the first part of this 
alternative explanation is that the policy content of dissent mat-
ters, which is indeed the case. voters do react to whether MPs are 
centrist or extreme, and this effect is conditional on the voter’s own 
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self-reported left-right ideological position and is indeed clearer 
in austria and germany (Figures B5 to B8 in the online support-
ing information). However, across subgroups based on ideological 
congruence, voters in austria and germany tend to reward dissent 
more than voters in the united Kingdom. Hence, this alternative 
explanation for our cross-country differences fails to hold.
Overall, our cross-country differences in reactions to dissent 
remain even when accounting for key alternative explanations. 
Hence, it is likely that variation in the perceived costs of dissent 
can explain these differences. However, further evidence of our sig-
nal cost theory can also be provided by within-country analyses, to 
which we now turn.
Within-Country Variation in Reactions to Dissent
Next, we test the expectation that there is a hierarchy of voter 
reactions in terms of the types of dissent MPs engage in. to exam-
ine this, we disaggregate the effects for dissent based on whether 
this was expressed internally, in the media, or in parliamentary 
debates. Figure 4 present these effects for the united Kingdom, 
germany, and austria. as in Figure 3, the effects of any given type 
of dissent are generally larger in germany and austria than in 
Britain. Consistent with Hypothesis 2a, in all country samples we 
find that voter evaluations of an MP increase significantly more 
when an MP dissents both verbally and by voting against his or 
her party than when an MP dissents mainly verbally. We take this 
as evidence that voters value the additional costs MPs incur by 
voting against their party.25  Overall, our results indicate that the 
political context of dissent within each country also matters for 
dissent evaluations.
However, Hypothesis 2b is not confirmed: across all three 
countries, respondents do not differentiate between dissent in the 
media or in debates versus verbal dissent in internal meetings. this 
nonfinding could imply that voters perceive these different types 
of verbal dissent as equally costly and thus ignore this variation 
in their assessment of MPs or that voters do not react to more 
nuanced variation in dissent costs. Overall, we nonetheless find 
strong evidence that whether an MP dissents matters to voters, 
particularly if  dissent is backed up by voting against a party.
Finally, in an exploratory analysis, we also consider an ad-
ditional within-country variation in costs, specifically between 
government and opposition MPs. it is arguably more costly for 
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government MPs to dissent from their party, as this endangers 
policymaking and government stability more than disunity among 
the opposition. Moreover, slapin et al. (2018) argue that dissent is 
a more effective tool for communicating policy positions for gov-
ernment MPs. Hence, it may be that voters react more to rebellion 
among government MPs than among opposition MPs.
at the time of the surveys, austria and germany had “grand” 
center-left–center-right coalitions, while the united Kingdom was 
governed by the Conservatives. We can thus examine the poten-
tial moderating effect of government participation by comparing 
Figure 4  
reactions to different types of dissent 
Note. this plot shows estimated aMCes of the randomly assigned MP dissent attribute 
on MP ratings for Britain (N = 1,988), germany (N = 1,992), and austria (N = 2,164). 
dissent behavior has seven categories with “MP who never dissents, votes with party” as the 
reference category (indicated by the lack of a horizontal bar). MP ratings are measured 
on a 7-point scale (from 1 [very unhappy] to 7 [very happy]). estimates are based on an 
OLs regression with clustered standard errors. sociodemographic weights were applied. 
Horizontal bars represent 95% confidence intervals. surveys were carried out by ssi in 
March 2017.
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Labour MPs in Britain and FPÖ MPs in austria to other MPs. (in 
germany, all potential MPs were in the government.) One limita-
tion of our research design is that being in government was not 
randomly assigned in our experiment: the effects we find are differ-
ences between MP parties and may thus stem from other sources 
as well.
We find that reactions to dissent are indeed statistically sig-
nificantly higher for governing parties (see Figure B1 in the online 
supporting information). Note that while rebellion is valued more 
for Conservative than for Labour MPs in Britain, positive reac-
tions are still lower than in germany or in austria, so this finding 
does not affect our conclusion concerning the country-level results 
testing Hypothesis 1.26 
Conclusion
When it comes to evaluating politicians and government, not 
all signals these actors send to voters are equally useful. One way 
in which voters decide how much weight to place on signals is by 
taking into account the costs incurred in sending them: the more 
costly the signal, the more likely it is to contain worthwhile in-
formation. in this article, we applied this framework to explain-
ing cross-national differences in evaluations of dissent, focusing 
in particular on the fact that disagreement with the party line may 
also be seen as containing valence-type information about the leg-
islator’s integrity and trustworthiness.
in studying the effects of dissent as a costly valence signal, 
we show how reactions to dissent vary between institutional set-
tings and between types of dissent. Our empirical analysis of voter 
perceptions in Britain, germany, and austria lends support to our 
theoretical framework: the potential rewards for dissent are higher 
where the costs to MPs are higher (i.e., in germany and austria) 
compared to where they are lower (i.e., in Britain). However, reac-
tions in germany and austria were similar, even though the per-
ceived costs of dissent are higher in the latter, which could be due 
to the fact that the institutional set-up in both countries is never-
theless similar. Within each country, the rewards are also higher 
when the type of dissenting act is particularly costly, that is, for 
voting against the party compared to merely speaking out publicly.
the fact that variation in signalling costs is associated with 
variation in reward for dissent provides further support for valence 
signalling theories of parliamentary behavior. One caveat is that 
26 Markus Wagner, Nick vivyan, and Konstantin glinitzer
we examine overall assessments of MPs, so we do not test directly 
whether dissent increases perceptions of competence, resolve, or 
trustworthiness. Hence, the mechanism of valence signalling could 
be unpacked further, and this could be a useful avenue for future 
research.
Our findings reveal an important and consequential irony 
about the work of MPs in parliamentary systems. voters value 
dissent more in those contexts where the personal vote is less rele-
vant, that is, where MPs have less to gain by building up a personal 
reputation among constituents and where they will be punished 
more severely for dissent. the relative ease of dissent in Britain 
appears to devalue this signal among voters. in contrast, the bar-
riers to voicing disagreement in germany and austria are high, so 
that this action still carries a lot of meaning for voters. in systems 
where the personal reputations of MPs are most useful electorally, 
these reputations are most difficult to construct because voters dis-
count the value of the signals sent. Hence, our research shows how 
difficult it may be for MPs to construct a personal vote precisely in 
those systems that encourage one.
More broadly, our argument and our findings imply that 
voters react to the institutional differences that generate signal-
ling costs. With the exception of doherty (2013), researchers have 
often been skeptical of the extent to which voters are aware of 
institutional differences, for instance, in terms of attributing re-
sponsibility for economic developments (achen and Bartels 2016; 
rudolph 2006). Our results show that voters do react to important 
differences in cross-national institutional arrangements. Hence, 
institutions matter not just for how MPs and parties act, but they 
also help to determine how voters evaluate that behavior. Our 
findings also relate to the literature on “clarity of responsibility” in 
economic voting (duch and stevenson 2008; Häusermann, Kurer, 
and schwander 2016; Powell and Whitten 1993), which shows that 
the competency signal generated by the economy is more muted 
when responsibility is shared between actors. However, this re-
search does not consider the costs of signals to the actors evalu-
ated nor how institutions affect these costs. Overall, we argue that 
signal costs as well as the impact of institutions on these costs cre-
ate key implications for how voters evaluate political actors.
although we do not explicitly test this here, our findings are 
also of relevance for theories that treat legislator dissent as a sig-
nal of ideological position (Carey 2007; Kam 2009; sieberer 2006; 
slapin et al. 2018), for they suggest that an MP’s legislative actions 
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may have more effect on constituents’ beliefs about the MP’s ideol-
ogy when such actions are more costly. Future research could test 
this by including more explicit information about the policy posi-
tions MPs take when dissenting on particular votes.
Concerning types of dissent, we do not find quite the strong 
pattern as depicted by Proksch and slapin (2015, 26), where differ-
ent levels of intraparty disagreement manifest themselves in turn 
in internal dissent, media dissent, parliamentary speeches, and 
voting. instead, in the eyes of voters, voting is distinct from other 
types of dissent. However, there is still the possibility that parties 
accurately understand which types of dissent are picked up most 
by the media and therefore become known to voters. in our experi-
ment, we provided voters with equal amounts of information for 
each type of dissent. in addition, it is possible to frame dissent in 
different ways, for example, as a welcome spirit of independence 
or as a treacherous willingness to betray one’s party. Our neutral 
descriptions could not capture these real-world complexities, but 
these should be studied further.
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NOTES
 1. Note that we define valence as positive, nonideological candidate char-
acteristics (stone and simas 2010), and not as the ability to deliver universally 
endorsed goals (Clarke et al. 2011).
 2. One partial exception is doherty (2013), who shows that voters in the 
united states interpret legislators’ congressional voting behavior in ways that 
take into account their institutional incentives to favor their own district.
 3. in related research, Patty et al. (2019) find evidence that when party 
leaders appoint an ideologically divergent legislator from their party to an im-
portant legislative committee—an act that is costly from the perspective of the 
party leader—voters interpret this as a signal of the legislator’s valence.
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 4. this theory of “costly signalling,” which was developed independently 
in evolutionary biology and in economics (gambetta 2009; spence 1973), has 
entered political science in different areas: Lupia (1992) highlights the role of cost 
in providing information to voters, and Fearon (1994) discusses costly signalling 
in international relations. recent research examines how other aspects of legisla-
tive behavior can be used to signal valence: Patty’s (2016) formal model suggests 
that one reason legislators may engage in costly policy obstruction is because it 
enables them to signal their character to constituents.
 5. Philip davies, House of Commons debate, 7 June 2005, available at: 
https ://publi catio ns.parli ament.uk/pa/cm200 506/cmhan srd/vo050 607/debte 
xt/50607 -19.htm (last accessed 27 december 2019).
 6. a further complicating factor, which we disregard here, is that not 
all MPs may be punished for dissent (Kauder, Potrafke, and riem 2017), while 
some may even be rewarded in open-list systems (Crisp et al. 2013; tavits 2009). 
However, dissent is at least likely to increase the probability of costs. Here, we 
assume that all MPs incur costs, for the sake of simplicity.
 7. Once k gets too large relative to the benefits of re-election, all MPs are 
deterred from engaging in dissent, and voters can no longer infer quality based 
on dissent. similarly, if  k is too low, even the lowest-quality politicians can afford 
to cast dissenting votes, meaning that voters can no longer infer quality based on 
dissent.
 8. How restrictive is the condition that the PdF of the distribution of 
MP quality is declining between q*(k1) and q*(k2)? When the distribution of 
MP quality is unimodal, then this condition implies that the initial equilibrium 
threshold q*(k1) lies above the mode. this condition is, we argue, likely to hold 
in the empirical applications in which we are interested, given that the modal 
behavior of MPs in each of the political systems that we study is not to dissent.
 9. We only focus on parliamentary systems here; incentives for personal 
vote seeking in presidential systems with divided powers are also strong.
 10. Note that we focus on between-system differences in costs. However, 
costs will also differ within systems, as some parties will have more means to 
discipline dissenters than others—for example, due to candidate-selection mecha-
nisms (Proksch and slapin 2015). the ability of parties to exact punishment may 
also vary over time, for example, as party organization changes.
 11. an additional, and usually irreversible, form of dissent is party switch-
ing, which is also viewed positively by voters (Mcandrews et al. forthcoming).
 12. We focus on verbal plus vote dissent versus verbal dissent alone because 
vote dissent without verbal dissent is rarely a plausible course of action for MPs, 
who almost always explain and defend their dissenting vote publicly as well.
 13. all translations into german are our own.
 14. the analyses for austria and Britain also weight for the joint distribu-
tion of education and age. We do not apply education-based weights in germany 
since our survey question does not exactly match census information; analyses 
that nevertheless include education weighting in germany closely match the re-
sults presented below. unweighted results are shown in appendix a in the online 
supporting information.
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 15. We examine the effects of voter-MP congruence in appendix B (Figures 
B5 to B8) in the online supporting information.
 16. We include the radical-right FPÖ in austria because it was leading in 
the polls at the time of the survey. Hence, we include parties at over 20% in the 
polls.
 17. the politician either grew up in the same region as this respondent or 
moved to this region before the last election.
 18. the occupations of the politician’s parents were factory worker, 
plumber, or bricklayer (working-class father) and shop assistant or hairdresser 
(working-class mother); insurance sales agent, small businessman, or policeman 
(middle-class father) and secretary or nurse (middle-class mother); and university 
professor, business owner, or politician (upper-middle-class father) and judge or 
general practitioner (upper-middle-class mother).
 19. the politician previously worked as one of the following: teacher, hotel 
manager, local council employee, accountant, gP, senior manager, journalist, 
bank manager, or press secretary for the party. We also stated the sector of the 
job (public or private).
 20. in a pretest, we also tried an additional question on the perceived com-
petence of each MP. several respondents indicated that separating these dimen-
sions proved to be too difficult.
 21. unlike Hainmueller, Hangartner, and yamamoto (2015), we use a 
paragraph instead of a table format. Our pretest in Britain and germany re-
vealed only small (and nonsignificant) differences in effect sizes across these two 
versions. Moreover, respondents on average needed as much time to perform the 
five choice tasks in both versions.
 22. the questions were asked after the conjoint analysis experiment.
 23. No “don’t know” option was provided.
 24. No “don’t know” option was provided. results using ordinal logistic 
regression are substantively identical to those presented in Figure 2.
 25. We cannot exclude that some voters inferred from verbal but not vote 
dissent that MPs act somewhat hypocritically, putting party over country. Note, 
however, that if  this was the dominant reaction of respondents to this treatment, 
we would observe negative average effects of verbal-only dissent.
 26. in appendix d in the online supporting information, we show indica-
tive results that respondents who see dissent as more costly also reward dissent 
more, providing further evidence for our overall hypothesis.
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